

Virtual Center for Network and Security Data



University of Michigan
Merit Network
University of Wisconsin
Georgia Tech
University of Washington



PREDICT PI MTG

Monday, March 21, 2011

University of California San Diego





Virtual Center for Network and Security Data

- Virtual Center for Network and Security Data is a collaborative effort among four institutions with the University of Michigan as lead. Its goals are to:
 - Develop a virtual data repository of rich, correlated, security datasets representing Internet scale behaviors
 - Provide a wide range of extremely relevant data sources, providing a global perspective on Internet behavior
 - Providing distributed services to simplify accessing and using this data



Participants

- Funding Phase I
 - Farnam Jahanian, University of Michigan
 - Morley Mao, BEACON
 - Manish Karir, Merit Network
- Funding Phase II
 - Paul Barford, University of Wisconsin
 - Dave Dittrich, University of Washington
 - Matthew Zekauskas and Rick Summerhill, Internet2
- Funding Phase III
 - Paul Barford, University of Wisconsin
 - Nick Feamster, Georgia Tech
- Menlo and Dataset Subcontracts
 - University of Washington
 - Wenke Lee, Georgia Tech



Merit Network, Inc. - PREDICT Dashboard

[System Status](#) [System Log](#) [Dataset Descriptions](#) [Reading Library](#) [Search](#) [About](#)

Current System Status(UTC):

Netflow: Up since February 1, 2010, 8:03 am
Darknet: Up since February 1, 2010, 6:00 am
BGP: Up since February 2, 2010, 9:13 am
DNS: Up since July 23, 2010, 3:58 pm

Data Collection Statistics:

Overall Cumulative Stats

Overall Total Stored Data: **122.29T**
Overall Total No of Files: 312,455
Overall Total Free Space: 19.03T
Yesterday Data Growth: 98.64G



Netflow

[Details](#)

Total Stored Data: 32.88T
Total No of Files: 231,113
Total Free Space: 8.67T
Yesterday Data Growth: 41.50G

Darknet

[Details](#)

Total Stored Data: 88.31T
Total No of Files: 47,283
Total Free Space: 7.16T
Yesterday Data Growth: 54.37G

BGP

[Details](#)

Total Stored Data: 845.01G
Total No of Files: 33,602
Total Free Space: 3.20T (shared with DNS)
Yesterday Data Growth: 1.42G

DNS

[Details](#)

Total Stored Data: 290.11G
Total No of Files: 457
Total Free Space: 3.20T (shared with BGP)
Yesterday Data Growth: 1.35G



Dataset Statistics

<u>Dataset</u>	<u>This Period*</u>
ims-bagle_backdoor	2
ims-dabber	2
ims-	
mydoom_backdoor	2
ims-mysqlbot	2
ims-sasser	2
ims-tcp42_wins	2
ims-tcp6101_veritas	2
ims-trend-1	2
ims-witty	2


* Issue #82 has been updated by Kyle Creyts.

manish, i still haven't heard anything from the fellow from clarkson. I will forward you another copy of the email in a few minutes.



New DNS Data Collection

Merit Network, Inc. - PREDICT Dashboard



- DNS dataset now incorporated into our monitoring/reporting structure
- Roughly 1-1.3GB data/day – 6 months
- 4 Resolvers – queries only no responses
- Sources of queries anonymized by hashing (SHA1) on a per day basis
- 25M-50M queries per day




DNS Data

- The Internet Domain Name System (DNS) is a distributed hierarchical naming system that at its most fundamental level provides a mapping between IP address and names. Examples of data in the DNS data category include DNS traffic (queries and/or responses), DNS server logs, and other DNS related meta data. These data may be collected at or near clients, recursive resolvers, or DNS servers for an enterprise, top-level, or root domain. Contents employ appropriate mechanisms to protect privacy. Possible uses of data in the DNS data category are: studying the DNS performance, detecting malicious behavior on the Internet (i.e., fast flux domain-based botnet detection), estimating the amount of network activity, inferring relative popularity of Internet applications.



Dataset creation via annotation



- Use Arbor Peakflow Alerts
- Attempt to validate event with ground truth (manual checks on live flows if event is still active, noc/ops engineer conversations)
- Extract netflow subset that includes the interesting traffic



New DDoS Dataset – syn-flood attack

- Goal: To create annotated sub-datasets from larger netflow data collection:
- syn-flood attack netflow dataset
 - syn-flood attack directed at UM IRC server
 - 10min duration (2011-03-04 16:18:01 to 2011-03-04 16:28:18)
 - Fingerprint: (proto 6 and (src port 3072 or src port 1024) and dst port 6667) and src 0.0.0.0/0 and dst 141.213.238.252/32
 - Peak traffic volume 139Mbps (362Kpps)
 - File size: 21GB (20 min subset of all merit netflow data)
 - Dataset Duration: 2011-03-04 16:08:00 to 2011-03-04 16:30:25
 - Anonymized




New Darknet Datasets

- Complete set Darknet packet capture samples of last 26 /8 allocations for IPv4
- 13 additional captures since last update (15TB)
- Total set: 1/8, 5/8, 14/8, 23/8, 31/8, 36/8, 37/8, 39/8, 42/8, 45/8, 49/8, 50/8, 100/8, *101/8, 102/8, 103/8, 104/8, 105/8, 106/8, 107/8, 176/8, 177/8, 179/8, 181/8, 184/8, 223/8*



The Fall of the Today's Internet



* February 3rd, 2010 - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) assigns the last of its IPv4 addresses

"Within the next 12 to 18 months, or perhaps sooner, every one of the 4.3 billion Internet Protocol addresses will have been allocated, and the Internet, at least as it exists today, will have reached full capacity."
NY Times



End of IPv4?

- Monitor the “last” of IPv4 space before the RIRs start allocating.
 - 102/8 AFNIC
 - 103/8 APNIC
 - 179/8 LACNIC
 - 104/8 ARIN
 - 185/8 RIPE




Are we Done then?

- More analysis!!!!
- Mobile Darknets
 - Identify mobile space, look at mobile scanning behavior
 - Darknets in Mobile space
- IPv6 Darknets
 - /14 with LACNIC waiting on LOA
- ERX Recaptured Networks
 - LACNIC wants to capture data on 30 /16s being returned

Internet Pollution – Redux



A Framework for Internet Pollution Analysis



- Work with RIRs to identify upcoming allocation
- Obtain LOA
- Advertise, Collect, Analyze, Archive, Provide to research community
- Cleanup/Quarantine recommendations
- Support from DHS via PREDICT Project




Cross RIR Darknet Traffic Analysis

- Goal: Analyze darknet traffic to determine how much and what kinds of pollution were present in each block and determine whether cleanup/quarantine were viable options
- 23/8, 100/8, 45/8 - ARIN
- 5/8, 37/8 - RIPE
- 105/8 – AfriNIC
- Several 7 day long datasets were collected – here we are presenting results from a 6 /8 collection with 3 simultaneous announcements (37, 45, 100)
- Alternate dataset has all 6 /8 announcements at the same time









Comparing Traffic Volumes






Comparing Hotspot Activity






37/8

Top 10 /16s in 37/8



Single /16 and single /24 account for majority of the captured traffic by byte count


Top 10 /24s in 37/8






37/8

Top 20 TCP destination ports (by packets) to 37.0.0.0/8



Top 20 UDP source ports (by packets) to 37.0.0.0/8





37/8

- Port 80 TCP traffic all appears to be directed at single IP address and appears to be related with facebook blocking in china

<http://www.renesys.com/blog/2010/06/two-strikes-i-root.shtml>

```
dig @dns1.chinatelecom.com.cn. www.facebook.com.
```


```
...
```

```
www.facebook.com. 11556 IN A 37.61.54.158  
www.facebook.com. 24055 IN A 78.16.49.15  
www.facebook.com. 38730 IN A 203.98.7.65
```




23/8

Cumulative Distribution Function of Destination /24s in 23.0.0.0/8




Top 10 /24s in 23/8






23/8

Top 20 UDP destination ports (by bytes) to 23.0.0.0/8



Top 20 UDP source ports (by bytes) to 23.0.0.0/8






- Traffic from source port 1201 to dest port 3100 from single source to single destination
- Video stream – decoded to 1080p video!




100/8






100/8

Top 10 /16s in 100/8




Top 10 /24s in 100/8






100/8

Top 20 TCP destination ports (by packets) to 100.0.0.0/8



Top 20 UDP destination ports (by packets) to 100.0.0.0/8






100/8

- UDP port 161 – SNMP traffic – default settings in manuals
- UDP source port 10000 – 33 byte packets – micro-torrent some SNMP etc.




5/8





5/8


- Traffic spikes of upto 250Mbps
 - 5.5.5.5 – UDP – 250Byte pkts random ports/srcip
- ICMP6! 5.113.105.0/24
- Flash video – 5.45.245.0/24






105/8

Cumulative Distribution Function of Destination /24s in 105.0.0.0/8




Top 10 /16s in 105/8






105/8

Top 20 TCP destination ports (by packets) to 105.0.0.0/8




Top 20 UDP source ports (by packets) to 105.0.0.0/8






45/8





45/8

Top 20 TCP destination ports (by packets) to 45.0.0.0/8




Top 20 UDP source ports (by packets) to 45.0.0.0/8






45/8

Top 10 /16s in 45/8



Top 10 /24s in 45/8





Conclusions

- Pollution tends to greatly skew darknet traffic
 - Diverse darknets – diverse reasons for pollution
- General characteristics of background radiation:
 - 15-30Mbps of base traffic for /8 spikes upto 70Mbps
 - Heavily dominated by conficker for TCP traffic
 - DNS for UDP traffic from small set of servers (*)
- Sharing results with relevant RIRs so that they can determine appropriate action regarding cleanup/quarantine



Conclusions

- 100/8, 5/8, 23/8 show relatively abnormal amounts of traffic to portions of the address space
 - Special consideration for:
 - 37.61.54.0/24
 - 23.19.5/24
 - 100.100.100.0/24, 100.0.2.0/24, 100.1.1.0/24
 - 5.5.5.0/24, 5.13.105/24, 5.45.245.0/24, 5.123.252.0/24
 - 45/8, 105/8 relatively clean

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Questions?

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